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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DANNY KRAMER, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
JAMES FRIEDMAN, 
Appellee, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 900276 
Appellant Danny Kramer ("Kramer") respectfully submits 
the following Appellant's Brief. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to the provisions of Utah Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This issues presented by this appeal are as follows: 
1. Did the district court commit error in granting 
Defendant/Appellee's James Friedman's ("Friedman") Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the basis that his indebtedness to 
Plaintiff/Appellant Kramer was barred by the statute of 
limitations? This issue is one of law to which the trial 
court's determination is entitled to no deference. At the very 
least, there are disputed material facts on this issue and the 
court abused its discretion in granting Summary Judgment. 
2. Was there adequate consideration for the promissory 
note executed by Friedman in favor of Kramer in 1987? This 
issue is one of law to which the trial court's determination is 
entitled to no deference. At the very least, there are disputed 
material facts on this issue and the court abused its discretion 
in granting Summary Judgment. 
3. Even if recovery on the original 1981 loan from 
Kramer to Friedman was otherwise barred by the statute of 
limitations, was the obligation revived by the operation of Utah 
Code Ann § 78-12-44? This issue is one of law to which the 
trial court's determination is entitled to no deference. At the 
very least, there are disputed material facts on this issue and 
the court abused its discretion in granting Summary Judgment. 
4. Did the district court commit error in dismissing 
Kramer's fraud claim on the basis that Kramer suffered no damage 
as a proximate result of the alleged fraud? This issue is one 
of law to which the trial courtfs determination is entitled to 
no deference. At the very least, there are disputed material 
facts on this issue and the court abused its discretion in 
granting Summary Judgment. 
III. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Proceedings Below. 
In March, 1981, Friedman asked his good friend Kramer 
for a $5,000.00 loan which Friedman urgently needed. Kramer 
told Friedman he didn't have the money, but he could try to 
arrange a loan from a third party who charged exorbitant 
interest. At Friedman's urging, Kramer in fact obtained a loan 
from the third party and gave the $5,000.00 to Friedman, which 
Friedman agreed to repay within sixty or ninety days. Friedman 
did not repay the money as agreed, but instead repeatedly 
requested and was granted by Kramer extensions of time in which 
to repay the debt until 1987. Finally, in March, 1987, Friedman 
suggested that he execute a promissory note to Kramer to take 
care of the indebtedness which he owed Kramer on the prior loan. 
Kramer agreed to this proposal and Friedman executed a 
promissory note in favor of Kramer dated March 21, 1987 in the 
compromised principal amount of $15,000.00 which was due and 
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payable in full on or before December 31, 1987. Friedman failed 
to pay the note when due and this action was commenced to 
recover the amount owing on the note. 
After this action was commenced, Friedman acknowledged 
very clearly in his deposition that he owed Kramer $5,000.00 
plus interest from when the loan had been made back in 1981, and 
that the $15,000.00 note was executed at least in part to take 
care of that indebtedness, which was the only indebtedness which 
Friedman had to Kramer. Notwithstanding those admissions, 
Friedman's counsel subsequently filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the basis that Kramer's claims against Friedman were 
barred by the statute of limitations. Although the district 
court viewed the result as "inequitable" and urged Kramer to 
appeal the Summary Judgment, the court nevertheless felt 
compelled to grant Summary Judgment, a copy of which is attached 
in Addendum A, observing: 
I recognize and I think all parties agree, 
that Mr. Kramer in good faith provided the money to 
Mr. Friedman, his friend, and did make the interest 
payments on the money, and I agree that Mr. 
Friedman's position at this stage, that the money 
is not owed based upon these technicalities, may 
not affect the morality of what's being done here, 
but nevertheless, I think legally Mr. Friedman's 
position is well taken. I must grant the Summary 
Judgment. [Transcript of Hearing, p. 21] 
For the reasons hereinafter set forth, it is 
respectfully submitted that the district court's ruling was in 
error and that Summary Judgment should not have been granted. 
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B. Statement of Facts. 
1. On or about March 12, 1981, Friedman asked his close 
personal friend, Kramer, to loan him $5,000.00, because he was 
unable to borrow from any commercial institution. [Kramer 
Depo., R. 86, 88; Friedman Depo., R. Ill, 112, 122, 130-131] 
2. Kramer arranged to obtain the money for Friedman 
through a third party who charged interest at the rate of 
$100.00 per week. [Kramer Depo., R. 89-90] 
3. In exchange for the loan, Friedman agreed to repay 
the initial $5,000.00 principal amount, as well as interest 
expenses incurred by Kramer, instructing Kramer to "Do whatever 
it takes and I will pay you back . . .". [Kramer Depo., R. 88, 
93, including correction sheet, R. 155] 
4. Friedman originally agreed to repay Kramer the 
$5,000.00 principal balance plus all interest which Kramer was 
required to pay within sixty to ninety days. [Kramer Depo., R. 
88, 89, 93, including correction sheet, R. 155; Kramer Aff., 
para. 4, R. 81] 
5. In May, 1981, Friedman attempted to repay the 
principal balance of the loan, without any interest, by check, 
but the check was returned unpaid when deposited by Kramer. 
[Kramer Aff., para. 6, R. 81; Friedman Depo., R. 123-124 and 
Exhibit 3, R. 133] 
6. Having failed to repay the loan within the original 
ninety days, Friedman requested that Kramer give him additional 
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time to repay the loan, and Kramer agreed to extend the time at 
Friedman's request. [Kramer Aff., para. 8, R. 81] 
7. Repeatedly during each year from March, 1981 until 
March, 1987, Friedman made additional requests for extensions of 
time to repay the loan and Kramer granted those extensions of 
time at Friedmanfs request. [Friedman Depo., R. 114-115, 121; 
Kramer Aff., para. 8, R. 81] 
8. In addition, during each of the several discussions 
which occurred from March, 1981, until March, 1987, Kramer and 
Friedman discussed the debt Friedman owed to Kramer, and 
Friedman repeatedly acknowledged the debt and verbally promised 
Kramer he would repay him. [Friedman Depo., R. 110, 113-114, 
121; Kramer Aff., para. 7, R. 81] 
9. Friedman has always acknowledged and admitted, even 
in his deposition taken subsequent to the filing of this case, 
owing the original $5,000.00 plus a reasonable amount of 
interest, or possibly an "exorbitant" amount of interest if 
Kramer could prove it was paid. [Friedman Depo., R. 116, 119-
121, 128] 
10. From the period beginning on or about March 12, 
1981 through approximately March, 1982, Kramer incurred and paid 
interest at the rate of $100.00 per week on the $5,000.00 he had 
obtained for and paid to Friedman. [Kramer Depo., R. 89-90, 94] 
11. From the period beginning approximately March, 1982 
through March 21, 1987, Kramer incurred and paid interest at 
prime rate plus two percent as quoted by First Interstate Bank, 
6 
Salt Lake City, Utah, on the principal sum of $10,000.00, which 
principal sum consisted of the $5,000.00 original debt plus 
interest accrued at the rate of $100.00 per week that Friedman 
had agreed to repay to Kramer. [Kramer Depo., R. 92-95] 
12. In March, 1987, Friedman suggested that Kramer 
accept a promissory note (the "1987 Note11) from Friedman for the 
compromised amount of $15,000.00, an amount which in Kramer's 
opinion was far less than the actual amount of the principal 
balance plus interest Friedman owed Kramer at the time. [Kramer 
Depo., R. 99, 102; Kramer Aff., para. 13, R. 82; promissory 
note, attached as Exhibit nB,f] 
13. Friedman clearly acknowledged that the $15,000.00 
principal balance recited on the face of the 1987 Note was 
related to the original $5,000.00 loan made by Kramer to 
Friedman in 1981 and the interest due thereon. When Friedman 
and Kramer discussed executing a note and at the time Friedman 
signed the 1987 Note, Friedman expressly acknowledged that he 
owed Kramer $5,000.00 plus interest and therefore would sign the 
promissory note as a compromised payoff of the 1981 loan. 
[Kramer Aff., para. 13, 15, R. 82; Friedman Depo., R. 116-117, 
120, 128] 
14. In March, 1987, when the 1987 Note was signed, no 
indebtedness existed between Kramer and Friedman other than the 
original 1981 loan for $5,000.00 and the interest amounts 
accrued thereon. [Friedman Depo., R. 127] 
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15. The indebtedness which Friedman admittedly owed 
Kramer at the time the 1987 Note was signed constituted 
consideration for the note. Kramer incurred debt on Friedman1s 
behalf in the amount of $5,000.00 and paid interest on that debt 
on Friedmanfs behalf for over six years, granted many extensions 
of time for Friedman to repay the original loan, accepted a 
compromised amount, and agreed not to pursue legal remedies or 
other collection efforts against Friedman with regard to the 
original 1981 loan for $5,000.00. [Kramer Depo., R. 96-98, 
including correction sheet R. 155; Kramer Aff., para. 4, 16, R. 
80, 82-83] 
16. After he signed the 1987 Note, Friedman made one 
payment to Kramer in the amount of approximately $1,110.65, 
which Friedman testified was made on the original $5,000.00 1981 
loan. [Friedman Depo., R. 106-108, 109, 126] 
17. The approximately $1,110.65 paid by Friedman 
coincided with the amount of interest due for a three month 
period of time on an executive line loan from First Interstate 
Bank obtained by Kramer to cover amounts borrowed earlier from 
the third party to make the $5,000.00 loan to Friedman and pay 
interest. [Kramer Depo., R. 91-92, including correction sheet, 
R. 155; Friedman Depo., R. 110] 
18. The 1987 Note dated March 21, 1987 was due and 
payable on December 31, 1987. Friedman failed to pay that Note. 
[Friedman Depo., R. 120; Kramer Aff., para. 17, R. 83] 
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IV. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-25(1) is determinative of 
the issues raised in Section B of Kramer's argument in this 
brief. That statute provides: 
Within four years: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation or 
liability not founded upon an instrument in 
writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, 
and merchandise, and for any article charged on a 
store account; also on an open account for work, 
labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; 
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases 
may be commenced at any time within four years 
after the last charge is made or the last payment 
is received. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-44 is determinative of the 
issues raised in Section D of Kramer's argument in this brief. 
That statute provides: 
In any case founded upon a contract, when any 
part of the principal or interest shall have been 
paid or an acknowledgement of an existing 
liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay the 
same, shall have been made, an action may be 
brought within the period prescribed for the same 
after such payment, acknowledgement or promise; but 
such acknowledgement or promise must be in writing 
signed by the parties being charged thereby. When 
a right of action is barred by the provisions of 
any statute, it shall be unavailable either as a 
cause of action or a ground of defense. 
V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The 1981 loan was not barred by the statute of 
limitations when the 1987 Note was signed or when this lawsuit 
was filed. Kramer gave Friedman numerous extensions of time for 
repayment of the original loan up to 1987 when the 1987 Note was 
signed. The statute of limitations did not begin to run as long 
as the extensions were in effect. Further, after the 1987 Note 
was signed, Friedman made one payment on the original loan. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1), Kramer had four years after 
that payment in which to commence suit. Friedman is also 
estopped from asserting the statute of limitations by virtue of 
his repeated promises to pay the debt and the extensions given 
at his request. 
2. Kramer gave adequate consideration for the 1987 Note 
because the statute of limitations had not expired on the 1981 
loan. At the very least substantial doubt existed as to whether 
the statute of limitations had run and the compromise of a 
doubtful and disputed claim constituted sufficient consideration 
for the 1987 Note. 
3. Even if the original 1981 loan was otherwise barred 
by the statute of limitations, it was revived by the operation 
of Utah Code Ann. , § 78-12-44, both when Friedman signed the 
1987 Note and when Friedman later made a payment on the original 
loan. 
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4. Kramer's fraud claim was erroneously dismissed 
because the statute of limitations had not expired when the 1987 
Note was signed. 
VI. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
It is well settled that in considering an appeal of a 
Summary Judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences must 
be viewed in a light most favorable to the Appellant and no 
deference is to be given to the trial court's conclusions of 
law. Summary judgment was not proper in this case because 
utilizing those standards material issues of fact existed 
requiring resolution at trial. See, e.g., Seftel v. Capitol 
City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah App. 1989); Payne ex rel 
Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 187-188 (Utah 1987); Scharf v. 
B.M.G. Corp. , 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Guardian State 
Bank v. Humphries, 762 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Utah 1988). 
B. The 1981 Loan Was Not Barred by the Statute of 
Limitations When the 19 87 Note Was Signed. 
1. The Statute Did Not Expire. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 78-12-25(1), Kramer 
had four years after the oricfinal 1981 loan was due or from the 
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date the last charge was made or; from the date the last payment 
was received in which to bring action to collect the loan. 
The most fundamental reason why the district courtfs 
ruling that this action is barred by the statute of limitations 
is wrong is because it was undisputed in the court below that 
Friedman requested and was granted by Kramer continual 
extensions of time for repayment of the loan until 1987 when the 
promissory note was executed. Friedman does not deny that the 
extensions were granted. Rather, Friedman simply argues that 
the extensions of time for repayment of the 1981 loan were not 
in writing. However, those extensions were not required to be 
in writing. See, Estate of Giquere, 366 N.W.2d 345 (Minn.App. 
1985); Colorado Inv. Services, Inc. v. Hager, 685 P.2d 1371, 
1376-77 (Colo.App. 1984); Intermedics, Inc. v. Grady, 683 S.W.2d 
842, 846 (Tex.App. 1984); Ted R. Brown & Associates v. Carnes 
Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 968 (Utah App. 1988). These extension of 
time for repayment operated to extend the due date of the 
original loan up to 1987 when the promissory note was signed. 
Therefore, the statute of limitations did not begin to run as 
long as the extensions were in effect. See, Estate of Giquere, 
supra, at 347; King v. Edel, 26 S.E.2d 365 (Ga. 1943). 
Thus, in Estate of Giquere, the maker of a promissory 
note was unable to pay the note as agreed and the payee orally 
agreed to accept payment when the maker sold certain property. 
The court held that because of the oral extension, the statute 
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of limitations did not begin to run until the maker sold that 
property, observing: 
An extension of time of payment is a valid and 
binding agreement to delay the enforcement of a 
promissory note. An extension may be made by an 
oral agreement without violating the rule excluding 
parole evidence to contradict, add to, or vary a 
written contract because the evidence is admitted 
only to prove a new agreement. Nor does an oral 
extension violate the Statute of Frauds. [3 66 
N.W.2d at 347] 
Another reason the statute did not run is that the 
original agreement was that Friedman would reimburse Kramer all 
the interest Kramer was required to pay from time to time to 
borrow the $5,000.00. Kramer made interest payments right up to 
1987. Under § 78-12-25(1) the statute did not begin to run 
until the last interest charge was paid by Kramer and was 
reimbursable by Friedman. 
Finally, the evidence was undisputed that after the 1987 
note was signed, Friedman made one payment of $1,110.65 which 
Friedman testified was on the original $5,000.00 loan. 
Therefore, under Utah Code Annotated, § 78-12-25(1), Kramer had 
four years after this payment was made in which to commence 
suit. 
2. Friedman is Estopped From Asserting the Statute of 
Limitations. 
The evidence below was uncontradicted that up to the 
time Friedman signed the 1987 Note in March, 1987, he repeatedly 
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admitted to Kramer the debt was still owing and repeatedly 
promised to repay that debt, including interest, but that he 
needed extensions of time within which to pay the debt, 
Friedman's conduct misled Kramer into not filing suit to recover 
the indebtedness owing. At the very least, there is a question 
of fact as to whether Friedman's conduct estops him from now 
raising the statute of limitations defense. See, Rice v. 
Granite School District, 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969); Butcher v. 
Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 (Utah App. 1987); Estate of Christensen v. 
Christensen, 655 P.2d 646 (Utah 1982); Sugarhouse Finance 
Company v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980). 
For example, in Rice v. Granite School District, supra, 
the Utah Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant on the basis that there was a genuine issue of 
fact whether the defendant was estopped from asserting the 
statute of limitations, observing: 
One cannot justly or equitably lull an 
adversary into a false sense of security thereby 
subjecting his claim to the bar of limitations, and 
then be heard to plead that very delay as a defense 
to the action when brought. Acts or conduct which 
wrongfully induce a party to believe an amicable 
adjustment of his claim will be made may create an 
estoppel against pleading the statute of 
limitations. [456 P.2d at 163] 
Similarly in Bomba v. W.L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 
1067 (7th Cir. 1978), the Seventh Circuit reversed a summary 
judgment on the basis that a genuine issue of material fact 
existed as to whether the defendant was estopped from asserting 
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the statute of limitations based on promises to return money to 
the plaintiffs, stating: 
... [T]he cases are legion that a promise to 
pay a claim will estop a defendant from asserting 
the applicable statute of limitations if the 
plaintiff relied in good faith on defendant's 
promise in forbearing suit. [Citations omitted]. 
The oft-quoted rule applicable in such a situation 
is: 
"Estoppel arises where one, by his conduct, 
lulls another into a false sense of security, and 
into a position he would not take only because of 
such conduct. Estoppel, in the event of a disputed 
claim, arises where one party by words, acts and 
conduct led the other to believe that it would 
acknowledge and pay the claim, if, after 
investigation, the claim were found to be just, but 
when, after the time for suit has passed, breaks 
off negotiations and denies liability and refuses 
to pay." Bartlett v. United States, 272 F.2d 291, 
296 (10th Cir. 1959). 
To the same effect, see Gagner v. Strekouras, 423 A. 2d 1168 
(R.I. 1980) (defendant had conceded liability prior to filing of 
suit). 
In the case at bar, Kramer relied on the repeated 
promises of his close personal friend that he would pay the debt 
if only Kramer would give him extensions of time to do so. Even 
after this lawsuit was filed, Friedman admitted in his 
deposition that he owed Kramer under the original loan 
agreement. Friedman's belated attempt to escape his rightful 
obligation through the bar of the statute of limitations must be 
rejected. At the very least, material issues of fact existed 
with respect to when the statute of limitations began to run and 
whether Friedman is estopped from relying on the statute of 
limitations. 
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C. Adequate Consideration Was Given by Kramer For the 
March 21, 1987 Promissory Note. 
Friedman erroneously argues that because the statute of 
limitations on the 1981 loan had supposedly expired when the 
1987 Note was signed, Kramer gave no consideration for the note 
so that unless Utah Code Ann. , § 78-12-44 operates to revive the 
original debt [see pp. 16-21, infra], the note is unenforceable. 
Friedman does not, however, dispute that under Utah law, 
an original debt is sufficient consideration in law to support 
a new obligation. Kuhn v. Mount, 44 P. 1036, 1038 (Utah 1896). 
Because, as previously demonstrated, the debt owed by Friedman 
to Kramer on the original 1981 loan was not barred by the 
statute of limitations at the time the 1987 Note was executed, 
or at the very least substantial doubt existed as to whether the 
debt was barred, the original debt was sufficient consideration 
for the 1987 Note. Moreover, in accepting the 1987 Note, Kramer 
compromised the amount he claimed was owing from Friedman, and 
agreed to give additional time for repayment and to forebear 
from bringing suit to collect. Thus, there was other sufficient 
consideration to support the promissory note. Sucrarhouse 
Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980); Allen 
v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823, 825 (Utah 1951); 
Restatement of Contracts, 2d, § 75. 
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In the court below, Friedman relied on Manwill v. Oyler, 
361 P.2d 177 (Utah 1961). That reliance is misplaced. Unlike 
the case at bar, the plaintiff in Manwill conceded that the 
statute of limitations had clearly run when the defendant orally 
promised years later to pay the debt. The court merely held 
that the moral obligation to repay the debt did not constitute 
valid consideration. Manwill is inapposite in the present case 
because here the original loan to Friedman was not barred by the 
statute of limitations. Furthermore, even if it is assumed for 
argument that the statute had run, there was at least 
substantial doubt as to whether the statute had run in view of 
the extensions for payment given by Kramer, Friedman's repeated 
promises to pay and Kramer's interest payments made to third 
parties over the years which were reimbursable by Friedman as 
they were made. Friedman's giving of a promissory note to 
resolve a doubtful and disputed claim was supported by the 
consideration of Kramer's compromising that claim.1 
Thus, in Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594, 596 (Wyo. 1981) 
the court observed: 
A contract made in settlement of claims is 
valid even if the claims settled are of doubtful 
worth. [Citations omitted] This means that this 
court will not look behind a settlement agreement 
Kramer also believes Manwill was wrongly decided. The 
statute of limitations is only an affirmative defense which, if 
timely raised, may bar recovery. The statute does not 
automatically bar debts. Thus, the debt, still exists unless and 
until the statute is raised as a bar by the debtor. Staker v. 
Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co., 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983). 
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to see who would have prevailed in a dispute out of 
which the settlement agreement arises. If the 
settlement agreement itself meets contractual 
requirements, it will be enforced. . . . The 
settlement of these claims by and of itself will be 
sufficient consideration to form a binding 
contract. 
Similarly in Kunce v. Phillips, 489 P.2d 329, 333 
(Colo.App. 1971), the court stated: 
The validity of a compromise is not impaired 
by the fact that it resolved issues differently 
than a court might have. [Citations omitted]. 
Thus, a claim need not be valid or well-founded to 
support a compromise and, as long as there has been 
good faith, the courts will not inquire into the 
merits of the claim or the actual rights of the 
parties in an effort to avoid or defeat a 
compromise. [Citations omitted] 
To the same effect, see Homar, Inc. v. North Farm Associates, 
445 A.2d 288, 290 (R.I. 1982); Harrington v. Warlick, 758 P.2d 
389, 390 (Ore.App. 1988). 
In conclusion, the trial court's finding that the 1987 
Note was not supported by consideration was manifestly 
erroneous. At the very least, material issues of fact were 
presented which could not be determined by summary judgment. 
D. Even If the Original 1981 Loan Was Otherwise Barred 
by the Statute of Limitations, It Was Nonetheless Revived By 
Operation of U.C.A., § 78-12-44. 
Even if it is assumed for purposes of argument that the 
original loan was barred by the statute of limitations when the 
1987 Note was signed and that there was no consideration for 
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that note, nevertheless both the execution of that note and 
Friedmanfs later payment on the original loan operated to revive 
that debt. 
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-12-44 provides: 
In any case founded on a contract, when any 
part of the principal or interest shall have been 
paid or an acknowledgement of an €^xisting 
liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay the 
same, shall have been made, an action may be 
brought within the period prescribed for the same 
after such payment, acknowledgement or promise; but 
such acknowledgement or promise must be in writing 
signed by the parties to be charged thereby. . . . 
[Emphasis added] 
Thus, either (1) a partial payment of a debt or (2) a written 
acknowledgement or promise to pay the debt will revive the debt. 
1. Written Acknowledgement or Promise to Pay. 
Kramer testified below that at the time the 1987 Note 
was signed, the only debt existing between Friedman and Kramer 
was the debt owing on the original $5,000.00 loan, that Friedman 
requested that Kramer take the Note in order to resolve the 
original loan obligation, and that was the only purpose for 
which the 1987 Note was signed. Friedman admitted in his 
deposition that the 1987 Note was partially related to the 
original loan and was intended to accomplish the repayment of 
the $5,000.00 plus reasonable interest. It was also undisputed 
that the 1987 Note was intended by both parties to be a 
compromised payoff of the original $5,000.00 principal balance 
and accrued interest. 
Friedman contended below that his execution of the 1987 
Note did not operate to revive the original debt because the 
note does not expressly refer to that debt, relying upon Salt 
Lake Transfer Co. v. Shurtliff. 30 P.2d 733 (Utah 1934). That 
case does not support Friedman's unduly restrictive view of 
Utahfs statute. In Salt Lake Transfer Co., the plaintiff argued 
that certain letters passed between the parties after the debt 
was barred by the statute of limitations were sufficient to 
revive the debt. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this 
contention, finding that there was nothing in the letters that 
admitted a present subsisting debt or an agreement to pay the 
debt. The Utah Supreme Court did not deal, one way or another, 
with the issue of whether the writing had to expressly refer to 
a specific debt. 
Contrary to Friedman's position, parole evidence may be 
properly considered to explain a writing, such as the 1987 Note, 
which operates to revive a time-barred cause of action. See, 
House of Falcon, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 583 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Ct.App. 
Tex. 1979) ; Weirton Ice & Coal Co. v. Weirton Shopping, 334 
S.E.2d 611, 614 (W.Va. 1985). Thus, in House of Falcon, Inc., 
supra, at p. 905, the court observed: 
The acknowledgement must in some way refer to 
the obligation or there must be introduced parole 
evidence that the statement was intended to 
acknowledge the debt being sued upon when the 
evidence indicates more than one debt is owing to 
the creditor or that there were no other debts 
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between the parties other than the one being sued 
upon. 
In Buxton v. Diversified Resources Corp., 634 F.2d 1313, 
1317 (10th Cir. 1980), the court, applying Utah law, observed: 
. . . [T]he acknowledgement need not express 
the intention of acknowledging by use of the term, 
it is legally sufficient if the purported 
acknowledgement is in such terms as to communicate 
this concept or thought to the person receiving it. 
Similarly, in Weirton Ice & Coal Company, supra, at 
pages 614-615, the court observed: 
A writing may be sufficient even though it 
requires some explanatory evidence. In the single 
Syllabus of Hill, we held that extrinsic evidence 
can be used to make certain the amount of the 
debt... 
We elaborated more fully on this concept in 
Syllabus point 5 of Abrahms v. Swann ... : 
"If such acknowledgement or promise is 
contained in a letter of the defendant to the 
plaintiff, it is not necessary that the amount of 
the debt or that its date should be specified in 
the letter, but the particular debt to which the 
letter refers, may be identified by extrinsic 
evidence, written or parole; and if so identified 
clearly, and the promise is unequivocal, or the 
acknowledgement is of a subsisting debt, for which 
the defendant is liable and willing to pay, the bar 
of the statute of limitations is thereby removed.11 
[Emphasis added] 
Finally, in Citizens Bank of Clovis v. Teel, 742 P. 2d 
502, 504, (N.Mex. 1987), the New Mexico Supreme Court opined: 
It has long been recognized that, when the 
words of acknowledgement or promise do not 
expressly refer to the debt sought to be recovered, 
whether they are deemed as referring to such debt, 
it is usually a question of fact. [Citation 
omitted]. If, on motion for summary judgment, 
[defendant] were to preclude the court from 
considering a reasonable inference that the 
admission was in reference to the . . . debt 
described in the pleadings, it was his burden as 
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movant to show conclusively that in fact the 
admission had reference to some other debt. 
See also, Kuhn v. Mount, supra, at p. 138. 
Friedman's promise to pay the original loan contained in 
the 1987 note is clearly sufficient, both under the statute and 
case law, to invoke the operation of the statute regardless of 
whether there was an acknowledgement of a pre-existing debt. 
Thus, in Salt Lake Transfer Co., v. Shurtliff, 30 P.2d 733, 736 
(Utah 19 34), the court observed: 
This statute is satisfied if there be in 
writing either an acknowledgement of an existing 
liability, debt or claim, or promise to pay. It is 
not necessary that there be both an acknowledgement 
and a promise to pay. [Emphasis added] 
See also, Beck v. Dutchman Coalition Mines Co., 269 P.2d 867, 
869 (Utah 1954). 
In the case at bar, the parole evidence overwhelmingly 
demonstrated that the 1987 Note was executed to resolve the 
original $5,000.00 loan. The evidence was undisputed that at 
the time that Note was signed the only debt between Friedman and 
Kramer was the original $5,000.00 loan and that Friedman 
acknowledged that he owed the debt. At least for the purpose of 
Friedman's Motion for Summary Judgment the court was required to 
assume that the 1987 Note was executed to resolve the $5,000.00 
loan. It would turn the statute on its head to rule under these 
circumstances that the 1987 Note was not sufficient to revive 
the debt. 
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2. Partial Payment of Loan. 
Even if the 1987 Note were not sufficient to revive the 
debt, Friedmanfs later actual payment of $1,110.65 which 
Friedman admitted was on the* original $5,000.00 loan [Friedman 
Depo. R. 106-107, 109 and 126], operated to revive the debt 
under Utah Code Annotated, § 78-12-44. The statute specifically 
provides that when "any part of the principal or interest shall 
have been paid . . . an action may be brought within the period 
prescribed for the same (i.e. four years) after such payment." 
In conclusion, Friedman's attempt to avoid the 
application of § 78-12-44 under the facts of this case is 
absolutely without substance. At the very least, issues of fact 
exist in this regard which must be resolved at trial. 
E. Kramerfs Fraud Claim Was Erroneously Dismissed. 
Friedman's contention, which was accepted by the 
district court, that Kramer was not damaged or injured by 
Friedman's fraud as a matter of law was premised solely on the 
incorrect conclusion that the 1987 note was unenforceable when 
executed because the statute of limitations had expired. As 
previously demonstrated this position is utterly devoid of merit 
for any number of reasons. Thus, it was error to dismiss the 
fraud claim. 
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VII. 
CONCLUSION 
In deciding Friedman's Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
district court was required to accept as true the evidence 
favorable to Kramer together with all reasonable inferences that 
could be taken therefrom and to resolve all doubts in Kramer's 
favor. Utilizing that standard, it was manifest error to 
dismiss Kramer's Complaint. Friedman admittedly prevailed upon 
his good friend to arrange a loan for him and then, after 
failing to repay the loan as agreed, utilized his friendship to 
obtain numerous extensions for repayment over the years, always 
assuring Kramer that the debt would be repaid. Friedman simply 
cannot hide behind the statute of limitations to slither out of 
that obligation. It is respectfully submitted that the Summary 
Judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for trial. 
«—-» day of June, 1990. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
js kramer\brief 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ay of June, 1990, four 
(4) copies of the Appellant's Brief was mailed, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Steven W. Dougherty, Esq, 
ANDERSON & WATKINS 
50 West Broadway, Seventh FLoor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANNY KRAMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES FRIEDMAN, 
Defendant. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C 88-3870 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
On January 29, 1990, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
heard before the Court, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding. Plaintiff 
was represented by Peter L. Rognlie; Defendant was represented by Timothy W. 
Miller and Steven W. Dougherty. After full consideration of the pleadings, the 
arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court made 
conclusions of law on the record. Accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and all claims for relief s tated therein shall be, 
and hereby are, dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED: January _ _ / _ _ , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
^/ 
J. Dennis Frederick 
rvi liniT A 
APPROVED AS TO FORM:_ 
BURBIDGI 
, 1990 
ANDERSON <5c WATKINS 
By _ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ _ 
Tjfriothy W. £j7ller ^ 
/At to rneys for Defendant 
DATED: January— «/ , 1990 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
On this 2-9 day of tludgmnrvt, 1990, I hereby caused to be mailed, via 
first-class United States mail, postage prepaid, a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to the following: 
Peter L. Rognlie, Esq. 
BURBIDGE <5r MITCHELL 
139 East South Temple, Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
On this day of , 1990, I hereby certify that I 
caused a true and accurate copy of the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be 
deposited in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, to the following 
at the addresses indicated: 
Timothy W. Miller, Esq. 
ANDERSON & WATKINS 
700 Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Peter L. Rognlie, Esq. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
139 East South Temple, Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CLERK OF THE COURT: 
By 
Deputy Clerk 
//TWM/FriedOrder 
PROMISSORY NOTE 
$15,000.00 March 21, 1987 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
JAMES FRIEDMAN, hereby promises to pay to the order of 
DANNY KRAMER the sum of Fifteen Thousand ($15,000) in lawful 
currency of the United'States on December 31, 1987. The 
principal amount will bear and accrue interest at the base 
rate {prime rate) quoted by First Interstate Bank, Salt Lake 
City, Utah on the date hereof. The principal and interest 
may be paid prior to maturity hereof without prepayment 
penalty. 
The Maker hereby waives presentment and demand for 
payment, notice of nonpayment, protest and notice of protest. 
Maker further agrees to pay all cost of collection, including 
reasonable attorneys' fees, if this note is not paid at 
maturity. 
,James Friedman 
/ U 
f*\n nniT D 
